Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category:  Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy by Scott, Elizabeth S. et al.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 85 Issue 2 Article 12 
2016 
Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, 
Social Change, and Justice Policy 
Elizabeth S. Scott 
Columbia University 
Richard J. Bonnie 
University of Virginia 
Laurence Steinberg 
Temple University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law and Psychology 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Richard J. Bonnie, and Laurence Steinberg, Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal 
Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 641 (2016). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol85/iss2/12 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 641 
YOUNG ADULTHOOD 
AS A TRANSITIONAL LEGAL CATEGORY:  
SCIENCE, SOCIAL CHANGE, 
AND JUSTICE POLICY 
Elizabeth S. Scott,* Richard J. Bonnie** & Laurence Steinberg*** 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, much attention has focused on developmental brain 
research and its implications for the regulation of crime.  Public and policy 
interest has been directed primarily toward juveniles.  In light of recent 
research, courts and legislatures increasingly have rejected the punitive 
response of the 1990s and embraced a developmental approach to young 
offenders.1  Of particular importance in propelling this trend has been the 
framework offered by the U.S. Supreme Court in a series of Eighth 
Amendment opinions that have rejected harsh adult sentences for 
juveniles.2  These decisions, supported by adolescent brain research,3 rested 
on two empirically based principles:  First, juvenile offenders, due to their 
developmental immaturity, typically are less culpable and, therefore, 
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Criminal Law and are grateful to the Foundation for its support of research that has advanced 
understanding of young adults.  This Article is part of a symposium entitled Criminal 
Behavior and the Brain:  When Law and Neuroscience Collide held at Fordham University 
School of Law.  For an overview of the symposium, see Deborah W. Denno, Foreword:  
Criminal Behavior and the Brain:  When Law and Neuroscience Collide, 85 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 399 (2016). 
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 1. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 
206–13 (2008); see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADS., REFORMING JUVENILE 
JUSTICE:  A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 31–88 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2013). 
 2. In 2005, the Supreme Court held that the Eight Amendment prohibits the death 
penalty for crimes committed by juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 
(2005).  In 2010, the Court prohibited the imposition of life without parole for juveniles 
committed by juveniles. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).  Two years later, the 
Court extended Graham, holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the mandatory 
sentence of life without parole even for juveniles convicted of homicide in Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).  Most recently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. 
Ct. 718, 736 (2016), the Court held that Miller created a rule of substantive constitutional 
law and therefore must be applied retroactively. 
 3. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65 (citing developmental brain research showing 
differences between juvenile and adult brains); Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (same). 
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deserve less punishment than their adult counterparts.  Second, because 
their criminal conduct is the product of immaturity, most juveniles have a 
greater potential to reform than do adults.  This framework has influenced 
broader sentencing reforms for juvenile offenders.4  It has also led 
policymakers to focus on the impact of juvenile justice settings and 
programs on youth development and crime reduction.5 
More recently, advocates and some policymakers have argued that 
developmental research should shape the law’s response to young adult 
offenders.6  Over the past decade, developmental psychologists and 
neuroscientists have found that biological and psychological development 
continues into the early twenties, well beyond the age of majority.7  
Recently, researchers have found that eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old 
adults are more like younger adolescents than older adults in their 
impulsivity under conditions of emotional arousal.8  It is also well 
established that young adults, like teenagers, engage in risky behavior, such 
as drinking, smoking, unsafe sex, drug use, and criminal activity, to a 
greater extent than older adults.9  The possibility that much risky behavior, 
including involvement in criminal activity, is a product of psychological 
and social immaturity raises the question of whether the presumption of 
reduced culpability and greater potential for reform should be applied to 
young adult offenders as well as juveniles. 
Major reform of this kind would represent a substantial departure from 
what has become a commonly recognized boundary in the justice system 
between juveniles and adults, marked by the age of majority:  legal adults 
charged with criminal acts are typically subject to a standard punishment 
regime that applies to all offenders whether they are eighteen or thirty-five 
years old.10  This response is not surprising.  Legal line drawing is 
inevitably arbitrary at the margins, and age eighteen, the default age of 
 
 4. See ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
JUVENILE SENTENCING 25–29 (2015), http://modelsforchange.net/publications/778/The_ 
Supreme_Court_and_the_Transformation_of_Juvenile_Sentencing.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WM4Z-XWTC]. 
 5. See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 241–80. 
 6. See Vincent Schiraldi et al., Community-Based Responses to Justice-Involved Young 
Adults, NEW THINKING COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, Sept. 2015, at 1–3 (recommending that 
cases involving young adults be handled by the juvenile system).  Recently, New York City 
Mayor Bill de Blasio took action to address some of the unique challenges posed by young 
adults in the New York City justice system. See Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Mayor 
de Blasio Appoints Heads of Key Criminal Justice Positions (Mar. 11, 2014), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/082-14/mayor-de-blasio-appoints-heads-
key-criminal-justice-positions#/0 [https://perma.cc/Q9JE-74M7]. 
 7. See LAURENCE STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY:  LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE 
OF ADOLESCENCE 5 (2014). 
 8. See Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Is an Adolescent an Adult?:  Assessing 
Cognitive Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 549, 559–60 
(2016). 
 9. Different types of risky behavior peak at different ages.  For example, binge drinking 
peaks at age twenty, while involvement in criminal activity peaks at age eighteen. 
 10. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
547, 547–50 (2000). 
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majority, seems like a natural dividing line between adult and juvenile 
status in the justice system.11  Further, individuals between the ages of 
eighteen to twenty-one commit a large portion of serious offenses and have 
high recidivism rates.12  Thus, limiting the rehabilitative and more lenient 
approach of the juvenile system to youths who are legal minors might be 
justified on public safety grounds.  Moreover, until recently, no compelling 
scientific argument existed for treating young adults differently than their 
older counterparts.  Not so long ago, developmentalists thought that 
eighteen-year-olds were biologically mature and that young adult brains 
were fully developed.13 
In other legal domains, the age at which children attain adult status is 
often raised or lowered from the default age of majority (age eighteen) 
when social welfare interests are served.14  Is it time to reconsider the law’s 
approach to young adult offenders in light of the recent scientific research? 
In our view, modest policy reform is justified, although the 
developmental research suggesting that young adults are not fully mature is 
in an early stage.  In part we reach this conclusion because the scientific 
research is reinforced by demographic data indicating that the social 
transition to independent adulthood extends well beyond the age of 
majority.  In contemporary society, age eighteen no longer marks the 
assumption of mature adult roles.  Only a small percentage of young adults 
today marry or live self-sufficient lives.  Instead, this period has become a 
critical developmental stage of extended dependency and investment in 
acquiring the skills necessary to accomplish the transition to mature 
adulthood.15  For many young adults in the justice system, the prospect of 
successfully navigating this transition is low. 
This Article seeks to advance discussions about the potential implications 
for justice policy of recent neuroscientific, psychological, and sociological 
research on young adults.  In doing so, we emphasize the importance of not 
exaggerating either the empirical findings or their policy relevance.  The 
available research does not indicate that individuals between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty are indistinguishable from younger adolescents in 
attributes relevant to criminal offending and punishment.16  Thus, we are 
skeptical on both scientific and pragmatic grounds about the merits of the 
proposal by some advocates that juvenile court jurisdiction should be 
 
 11. See id. at 548. 
 12. See CRAIG A. PERKINS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AGE PATTERNS OF VICTIMS OF 
SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIME 2 (1997), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/apvsvc.pdf (finding 
that the eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old population commits the highest percentage of 
serious violent crimes out of all age groups) [https://perma.cc/MA5A-LGBE]. 
 13. See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADS., ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
BIOLOGY OF PUBERTY 1–3 (Michele D. Kipke ed., 1999). 
 14. See Scott, supra note 10, at 556. 
 15. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, INVESTING IN THE HEALTH AND WELL-
BEING OF YOUNG ADULTS (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2015) (providing a comprehensive 
discussion of the changing nature of young adulthood and finding young adulthood in 
contemporary society to be a vulnerable period of extended dependency and proposing 
policy reforms). 
 16. See infra Part I. 
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categorically extended to age twenty-one.17  But the research does suggest 
that young adults, like juveniles, are more prone to risk-taking and that they 
act more impulsively than older adults in ways that likely influence their 
criminal conduct.  Moreover, correctional reform is justified because young 
adult offenders, like noncriminal young adults and juvenile offenders, are 
more likely to become productive members of society if they are given the 
tools to do so during a critical developmental period. 
Policymakers today can draw lessons from the developmental model that 
has shaped juvenile justice reform.  At the heart of this reform is a 
conception of adolescence as a distinct stage between childhood and 
adulthood.18  This conception has supported a classification of juveniles as 
an intermediate category of offenders who are neither excused for their 
crimes as children nor deemed fully responsible adults.19  Juvenile justice 
programs increasingly respond to the developmental needs of adolescent 
offenders, recognizing that this is the best means of promoting their 
productive engagement in society and reducing crime.20  Young adults 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one constitute a less well-defined 
category that has only recently received even informal acknowledgment.  
But this developmental stage has taken on heightened importance as a 
period of preparation for adult roles.  We conclude that the research 
supports a regime that recognizes young adults as a transitional category 
between juveniles and older adult offenders. 
Part I of this Article analyzes the behavioral and neuroscientific research 
on young adults.  The research on age patterns of risk-taking, combined 
with the neuroscientific and psychological research on young adults, 
suggests that the period of young adulthood can be understood as a 
transitional stage between adolescence and mature adulthood.  Part II turns 
to the sociological research that reinforces this conception of young adults 
as occupying a transitional developmental stage.  Finally, Part III explores 
the implications of the developmental and sociological research for crime 
regulation.  We conclude that many of the developmental lessons that have 
driven reforms of the treatment of juveniles in the justice system can inform 
the response to the criminal conduct of young adults.  Young adults should 
be treated as a distinct, transitional category subject to reduced sanctions for 
less serious crimes, special expedited parole policies, and correctional 
programs and settings designed to serve their developmental needs.  This 
approach can promote the social welfare goals of the justice system more 
effectively than the conventional binary approach that prevails today. 
 
 17. See Schiraldi et al., supra note 6. 
 18. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 31. 
 19. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the 
Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 FUTURE CHILD. 15, 19 (2008). 
 20. See infra Part III. 
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I.  BEHAVIORAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND NEUROBIOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN YOUNG ADULTS 
Studies of behavioral, psychological, and neurobiological development 
indicate that the years from the late teens to the early twenties constitute a 
transitional period that bridges adolescence and mature adulthood.  
Development is gradual, and the psychological boundaries between 
adolescence and adulthood are fuzzy.  Although eighteen- to twenty-one-
year-olds are in some ways similar to individuals in their midtwenties, in 
other ways, young adults are more like adolescents in their behavior, 
psychological functioning, and brain development.  Thus, developmental 
science does not support the bright-line boundary that is observed in 
criminal law under which eighteen-year-olds are categorically deemed to be 
adults. 
A.  Age Patterns of Risk-Taking Behavior 
An important similarity between adolescents and young adults—
potentially relevant to justice policy—is that eighteen- to twenty-one-year-
olds, like adolescents, engage in risk-taking behavior (including 
involvement in criminal activity) at a higher rate than older adults.21  
Research on the developmental trajectory of criminal behavior has 
consistently documented an age-linked pattern of offending—the “age-
crime curve”—in which rates of criminal behavior increase over the course 
of adolescence, peak around age eighteen, and then decline during the early 
twenties.22  Therefore, young adulthood is both the stage during which 
criminal behavior is most common and the period during which the vast 
majority of offenders begin desisting from crime.  In this regard, young 
adulthood is arguably the most significant transitional period in the 
development of criminal behavior. 
Young adult offending is best understood as part of a broader behavioral 
pattern, and not as an isolated phenomenon, because many forms of risk-
taking behavior are disproportionately likely during this period.23  It is 
noteworthy that the inverted U-shaped developmental pattern observed in 
the age-crime curve applies as well to most forms of risky activity, which 
increase over the course of adolescence, peak in the late teens or early 
twenties (the peak age varies somewhat across different behaviors), and 
then decline.24  According to a recent Institute of Medicine/National 
Research Council (IOM/NRC) report, young adults (aged eighteen to 
twenty-four) experience higher rates of morbidity and mortality than either 
 
 21. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 203–13; Teena 
Willoughby et al., Examining the Link Between Adolescent Brain Development and Risk 
Taking from a Social-Developmental Perspective, 83 BRAIN & COGNITION 315, 315–16 
(2013). 
 22. See generally Gary Sweeten et al., Age and the Explanation of Crime, Revisited, 42 
J. YOUTH ADOLESCENCE 921 (2013).  This pattern is found across the developed world, over 
time within the United States, and with respect to both violent and nonviolent crime. 
 23. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 15. 
 24. See generally Sweeten, supra note 22. 
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adolescents or older adults from a wide variety of preventable causes, 
including automobile crashes, physical assaults, gun violence, sexually 
transmitted diseases, and substance abuse.25  In short, developmental 
changes in criminal activity follow the same age pattern as developmental 
changes in risky, but noncriminal, activity.26 
Viewing criminal offending as a specific instance of the more general 
inclination of young adults to engage in risky activity can inform 
discussions of how we should respond to criminal behavior at this age.  
During the past two decades, developmental science has been invoked in 
discussions of juvenile justice reform to advance the argument that much 
adolescent crime is the product of developmental immaturity.27  This, in 
turn, supported policies based on the premise that adolescents are both less 
culpable and more amenable to reform than adults, in part, simply through 
maturation.28  To the extent that young adult offending is also the 
consequence of normative developmental changes that create a transient 
inclination toward risky behavior, it should prompt a similar conversation. 
B.  Explaining Young Adult Risk-Taking:  
Psychological Development in Young Adults 
In recent years, developmental scientists have sought to understand the 
underlying causes of age differences in risk-taking.  However, as we 
explain below, research on developmental differences between adolescents 
and adults often has not drawn age distinctions among individuals older 
than eighteen, and therefore is of limited value in understanding risk-taking 
among young adults.29  Nevertheless, theoretical models, advanced to 
explain heightened rates of risk-taking among adolescents relative to 
children or adults, can inform our discussion of risk-taking in young 
adulthood.  These “dual systems” or “maturational imbalance” models 
emphasize the different developmental trajectories of reward seeking and 
self-control.30  Heightened risk-taking during adolescence is understood to 
be the result of a developmental asynchrony wherein inclinations to pursue 
exciting, potentially rewarding experiences are especially strong, but the 
ability to control such urges is still relatively immature.  The tendency 
toward heightened sensation seeking is thought to be sparked by the 
 
 25. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 203–13. 
 26. In one large longitudinal study of serious juvenile offenders tracked for seven years, 
impulsivity was one of the best psychological predictors of offending in young adulthood:  
Individuals who developed mature impulse control were most likely to desist from crime. 
See Kathryn C. Monahan et al., Psychosocial (Im)maturity from Adolescence to Early 
Adulthood:  Distinguishing Between Adolescence-Limited and Persisting Antisocial 
Behavior, 25 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1093, 1093–95 (2013). 
 27. See generally SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1. 
 28. See id.  Adolescent brains are also more plastic than those of adults, which may 
contribute to amenability. See generally STEINBERG, supra note 7. 
 29. This limitation also applies to developmental neuroscience research. 
 30. See B.J. Casey, Beyond Simple Models of Self-Control to Circuit-Based Accounts of 
Adolescent Behavior, 66 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 295, 298–300 (2015); Elizabeth P. Shulman et 
al., The Dual Systems Model:  Review, Reappraisal, and Reaffirmation, 17 DEVELOPMENTAL 
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 103, 103–05 (2016). 
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hormonal changes of puberty, which are believed to increase activity in the 
brain’s reward pathways, making individuals more attentive, sensitive, and 
responsive to actual and potential rewards.31  However, because 
development of brain systems that regulate impulse control is more 
protracted, continuing into the early twenties, a period of vulnerability to 
risky behavior results.32  As some writers have described it, adolescence is 
a time when the “accelerator” is pressed to the floor, but a good “braking 
system” is not yet in place.33 
From this perspective, the relatively high rate of risky activity observed 
in late adolescence and young adulthood—including criminal offending—is 
likely due to a combination of high reward seeking and poor self-control, 
leading individuals to make impetuous, short-sighted decisions that 
privilege the potential rewards of risky choices and underestimate the 
potential costs.  According to this view, risk-taking declines as individuals 
develop more mature judgment, as a result of a decrease in reward seeking, 
an increase in self-control, or both.34  Importantly, these developmental 
changes, which continue into the early twenties, are now viewed as 
normative, driven by processes of brain maturation that are not under the 
control of young people. 
These theoretical models, and the research they have generated, have 
influenced discussions of juvenile justice policy over the past decade.35  
Indeed, the tendency of adolescents to make impulsive and shortsighted 
decisions is one of the characteristic features of adolescence highlighted by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in its Eighth Amendment opinions limiting the use 
of harsh sentences for juveniles.36  The Court also pointed to adolescents’ 
heightened susceptibility to social influence—particularly peer influence—
and to the relatively unformed nature of adolescents’ character, which 
makes them better candidates for rehabilitation.37  The Court found that 
these hallmark features of adolescence contribute to reduced culpability in 
juvenile offenders, as compared to adults, and to their greater potential to 
reform.  Now that policy discussions about the treatment of young 
offenders are beginning to include young adults, it is important to ask 
whether these characteristics apply to this group as well. 
The age patterns in risk-taking would seem to offer support for the 
conclusion that young adults are also affected by the developmental 
 
 31. See Ashley R. Smith et al., Impact of Socio-Emotional Context, Brain Development, 
and Pubertal Maturation on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 64 HORMONES & BEHAV. 323, 323–25 
(2013). 
 32. See generally Casey, supra note 30. 
 33. See STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 85. 
 34. See generally Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent 
Risk-Taking, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78 (2008). 
 35. See Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court 
Decisions About Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 
513, 513 (2013). 
 36. See generally Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005). 
 37. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
648 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
influences that contribute to juvenile offending—at least to some degree.38  
But the study of psychological development in young adulthood is less 
advanced, and the findings of this research are less consistent than the 
findings of research on adolescents.39  One limitation is that studies rarely 
survey a sample that includes adolescents, young adults, and individuals in 
their late twenties using the same measures for all three age groups.  A 
second limitation is that studies that span the necessary age range frequently 
lack the statistical power to compare narrowly defined age groups.  A third 
limitation is that many studies cluster individuals into broad age categories, 
often including in the same group individuals whose chronological age 
would place them on different sides of a legally important age boundary. 
One challenge is to formulate research questions in ways that are most 
informative to legal policy debates.  Scientists cannot point to a specific 
chronological age as the appropriate boundary between legal childhood and 
adulthood because different aspects of psychological and neural functioning 
develop along different timetables.40  But a reasonable, and potentially 
answerable, research question is whether development continues in legally 
relevant psychological domains beyond age eighteen, the presumptive age 
of majority.  The few existing studies that may be relevant to justice policy 
have yielded equivocal results that vary as a function of the outcome, age 
range, and sample studied.  Thus, a reasonable assessment is that the extant 
research is suggestive but inconclusive.  Nonetheless, it is possible to draw 
several broad, albeit cautious, conclusions. 
First, it is clear that individuals mature intellectually before they mature 
emotionally or socially and that emotional and social development 
continues past age eighteen in realms that are legally relevant.41  Thus, 
studies of age differences in basic cognitive abilities, such as memory or 
logical reasoning, do not find appreciable growth after age sixteen.42  This 
is consistent with studies of adjudicative competence, which also do not 
find significant age differences after sixteen.43  In contrast, studies of the 
two hypothesized contributors to adolescents’ immature judgment, often, 
but not always, have found continued decline in sensation seeking and 
improvement in self-control between ages seventeen and thirty.  However, 
 
 38. See infra Parts II–III. 
 39. See Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult?  
Implications for Law and Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 769, 769–72 (2016). 
 40. See Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development 
Inform Public Policy?, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Spring 2012, at 67, 67–70 (2012). 
 41. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?  Minors’ 
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 592–93 (2009). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors’ Consent to Treatment:  A 
Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 415–16 (1978); Thomas Grisso et al., 
Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial:  A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ 
Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 356–61 (2003). 
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the age at which developmental change is most evident during this interval 
depends on the specific outcome being assessed.44 
Second, conclusions about whether psychological development continues 
beyond age eighteen are highly task dependent.  Consider, for example, the 
question of whether young adults, like juveniles, are more susceptible than 
older adults to peer influence.  The answer is equivocal.  Studies of 
resistance to peer influence using self-reports do not find age differences 
after eighteen,45 but experimental studies comparing individuals’ 
performance on decision-making tasks when they are alone versus when 
they are with their peers find peer effects on task performance after this age, 
at least into the early twenties.  For example, exposure to peers increases 
young adults’ preference for immediate rewards,46 willingness to engage in 
exploratory behavior,47 and ability to learn from experience.48  In some 
studies, exposure to peers has been shown to increase young adults’ risk-
taking;49 but in other studies, this has not been found.50 
Third, psychological maturity among individuals at any given age varies 
considerably.51  Consider the research on the stability of personality over 
time.  As noted above,52 the Supreme Court cited the relatively unformed 
nature of character as a defining feature of adolescence that justifies more 
lenient sentences for juveniles. 
Is young adulthood a similarly inchoate stage of character development?  
The empirical literature on personality development is ambiguous.  The 
prevailing view among psychologists is that during adulthood, personality 
becomes more stable over time, but no consensus exists on when, if at all, 
personality ceases to change.53  Some studies have found that young 
 
 44. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity 
as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report:  Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764–66 (2008). 
 45. See generally Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age Differences in 
Resistance to Peer Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531 (2007). 
 46. See generally Lia O’Brien et al., Adolescents Prefer More Immediate Rewards When 
in the Presence of Their Peers, 21 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 747 (2011); Alexander Weigard 
et al., Effects of Anonymous Peer Observation on Adolescents’ Preference for Immediate 
Rewards, 17 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 71 (2014). 
 47. See Karol Silva et al., Peers Increase Late Adolescents’ Exploratory Behavior and 
Sensitivity to Positive and Negative Feedback, J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 7–9 (Aug. 19, 
2015), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jora.12219/epdf [https://perma.cc/9QWF-
3JS2].  
 48. See id. 
 49. See Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk 
Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood:  An Experimental 
Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 632–34 (2005). 
 50. See Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing Activity 
in the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F1, F7–F9 (2010). 
 51. See Steinberg, supra note 40, at 67–70. 
 52. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 53. See Avshalom Caspi & Brent W. Roberts, Personality Development Across the Life 
Course:  The Argument for Change and Continuity, 12 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 49, 51 (2001); 
Robert R. McCrae & Paul T. Costa, Jr., The Stability of Personality:  Observations and 
Evaluations, 3 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 173 (1994). 
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adulthood is a time of considerable stability in personality;54 others have 
found that it is a time of instability, especially during the transition from 
adolescence to young adulthood;55 and yet another group has found 
variation among individuals.56  Moreover, some studies have also found 
variability within individuals in the stability of personality, in that some 
traits appear to be considerably more stable than others.57 
Finally, age differences in psychological functioning in young adulthood 
vary as a function of the context in which individuals are assessed.  Recent 
work conducted under the auspices of the MacArthur Foundation Research 
Network on Law and Neuroscience (of which the authors are members) is 
illustrative.58  In this research, adolescents (ages thirteen to seventeen), 
young adults (ages eighteen to twenty-one), and somewhat older young 
adults (ages twenty-two to twenty-four) were asked to perform a standard 
task measuring self-control under conditions that were systematically 
manipulated to vary the degree and nature (positive or negative) of 
emotional arousal.59  Under nonarousing conditions, young adults’ 
performance did not differ from that of the younger or older subjects; 
however, the adolescents performed worse than the oldest group.60  Under 
conditions of positive arousal, the young adults performed comparably to 
the older group and better than the adolescents.61  Under negatively 
arousing conditions, however, the adolescent and young adult groups did 
not differ, and both performed worse than the oldest group.62  In other 
words, whereas the differences between adolescents under age eighteen and 
individuals older than twenty-one were observed consistently, differences 
between young adults and the other two age groups depended on the 
emotional context.  Sometimes young adults behaved like people in their 
mid-twenties.  But sometimes they behaved like teenagers—a conclusion 
that will surely resonate with those who spend time on college campuses. 
 
 54. See generally Brent W. Roberts et al., The Kids Are Alright:  Growth and Stability in 
Personality Development from Adolescence to Adulthood, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 670 (2001); Richard W. Robins et al., A Longitudinal Study of Personality Change 
in Young Adulthood, 69 J. PERSONALITY 617 (2001). 
 55. See generally Norma Haan et al., As Time Goes By:  Change and Stability in 
Personality over Fifty Years, 1 PSYCHOL. & AGING 220 (1986). 
 56. See generally M. Brent Donnellan et al., Personality Development from Late 
Adolescence to Young Adulthood:  Differential Stability, Normative Maturity, and Evidence 
for the Maturity-Stability Hypothesis, 75 J. PERSONALITY 237 (2007). 
 57. See generally Jatin G. Vaidya et al., On the Temporal Stability of Personality:  
Evidence for Differential Stability and the Role of Life Experiences, 83 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1469 (2002). 
 58. See generally Cohen et al., supra note 8. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
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C.  Neurobiological Research:  
Brain Development in Young Adulthood 
Research on the extent and nature of age differences in brain structure 
and function after age eighteen is also best characterized as suggestive but 
inconclusive.  As with behavioral research, very few studies have 
systematically examined age differences in brain development among 
individuals older than eighteen.  In most studies, adolescents are compared 
to “adults,” with the latter group composed of people who may be as young 
as nineteen or as old as fifty.  When adult comparison groups average data 
from such a wide age range, it is impossible to draw specific inferences 
about potential differences between young adults and their older 
counterparts. 
Brain maturation comprises several processes that vary in their 
developmental timetable across brain regions and systems.63  The most 
important components of brain maturation in adolescence and young 
adulthood involve changes in the prefrontal cortex and its connections with 
other brain regions.  The prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in advanced 
thinking abilities, including planning ahead and weighing risk and reward, 
and in self-regulation, including impulse control and the coordination of 
emotion and cognition.  Immaturity in the prefrontal cortex is thought to 
make adolescents and young adults more susceptible to impetuous and 
shortsighted decision making and more vulnerable to the effects of 
emotional and social arousal on intellectual functioning.64  This aspect of 
brain development has been critically important to discussions about the 
appropriate legal response to criminal activity in adolescents and young 
adults. 
The maturation of the prefrontal cortex is multifaceted, involving 
synaptic pruning (which increases the efficiency of information processing 
by eliminating unnecessary connections between neurons), myelination 
(which increases the speed of information processing by “insulating” neural 
pathways), and improved structural and functional connectivity (which 
enhances communication between the prefrontal cortex and other brain 
regions).  These processes are all ongoing during adolescence, but they are 
completed at different ages.65  For example, pruning of the prefrontal cortex 
is more or less complete by midadolescence, which is why there is little 
improvement in basic thinking abilities beyond this age.66  In contrast, 
connectivity, especially between the prefrontal cortex and brain regions that 
process rewards and respond to emotional and social stimuli, is not 
complete until the midtwenties,67 which is why aspects of social and 
emotional functioning, such as impulse control and resistance to peer 
 
 63. See generally Steinberg, supra note 40. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See generally Cohen et al., supra note 39. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See generally Nico U.F. Dosenbach et al., Prediction of Individual Brain Maturity 
Using fMRI, 329 SCIENCE 1358 (2010). 
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influence, are slower to mature.68  The bottom line is that brain systems that 
govern “cold cognition” (thinking that takes place under ideal conditions) 
reach adult levels of maturity long before those that govern “hot cognition” 
(thinking that takes place under conditions of emotional or social arousal).69  
In the MacArthur study mentioned earlier, patterns of brain activation and 
functional connectivity in young adults resembled those of teenagers when 
brain activity was assessed under emotionally arousing conditions but 
appeared more similar to those of people in their midtwenties when 
conditions were more neutral.70 
Studies of brain development in adolescence and young adulthood have 
not yet significantly informed our understanding of the neural 
underpinnings of age differences in susceptibility to social influence or in 
the potential for rehabilitation—characteristics considered important in 
legal policy discussions on juvenile crime.71  The research indicates that 
brain systems governing thinking about social relationships undergo 
significant change in adolescence in ways that heighten concerns about the 
opinions of others.72  Compared to adults, adolescents seem especially 
sensitive to both praise and rejection, making young people potentially 
more easily influenced by their peers.73  But very little research has asked 
whether and how these brain systems continue to change beyond the teen 
years.  One study that examined the impact of peers on neural responses to 
reward in a sample of adolescents (ages fourteen to eighteen), young adults 
(nineteen to twenty-two), and adults (twenty-four to twenty-nine) found that 
the presence of peers increased activation in this brain region among 
adolescents but had no impact in the other two age groups.74 
With respect to potential for rehabilitation, there is a growing consensus 
that adolescence is likely to be a period of heightened brain plasticity—the 
capacity of the brain to change in response to experience—not unlike the 
first few years of life.75  If so, juveniles are probably better candidates for 
rehabilitation than adults.  This strengthens the argument against imposing 
long sentences on juveniles and especially against harsh sentences that can 
inflict toxic harm during a susceptible developmental period.  It is not 
known, however, how long this period of plasticity extends.76  One 
difficulty is that much of the evidence of heightened brain plasticity in 
adolescence comes mainly from studies of rodents, whose development can 
 
 68. See generally Cohen et al., supra note 39. 
 69. See generally STEINBERG, supra note 7. 
 70. See generally Cohen et al., supra note 8; Marc Rudolph et al., At Risk of Being 
Risky:  The Relationship Between “Brain Age” Under Emotional States and Risk Preference 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
 71. See Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Development of the Social Brain in Adolescence, 105 J. 
ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 111, 112 (2012); Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Kathryn L. Mills, Is 
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189 (2014). 
 72. See Blakemore, supra note 71, at 112; Blakemore & Mills, supra note 71, at 189. 
 73. See Blakemore, supra note 71, at 112; Blakemore & Mills, supra note 71, at 189. 
 74. See generally Chein et al., supra note 50. 
 75. See generally STEINBERG, supra note 7. 
 76. See infra Part II. 
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be reliably segmented into just three stages:  infant, juvenile (peripubertal), 
and adult.77  Thus, the distinctions between “young adult” and “adult” that 
can be applied to humans cannot be applied to most other animals. 
Because the research described in this part is at a relatively early stage, 
its implications for justice policies directed toward young adults are 
uncertain.  It is clear that the psychological and neurobiological 
development that characterizes adolescence continues into the midtwenties, 
but the research has not yet produced a robust understanding of maturation 
in young adults age eighteen to twenty-one.  Studies find continued 
development during this period but also find that, in some ways, young 
adults are similar to adults in their midtwenties.  The research on age 
patterns in risk-taking and on emotional maturation—particularly on 
impulse control in negative arousal states and peer influence in social 
contexts—provides the most powerful evidence that young adult offending 
likely represents a continuation of adolescent risk-taking, driven by 
developmental forces; but many uncertainties remain.  The question is to 
what extent this still-developing body of research on young adults should 
affect justice policy. 
II.  THE CHANGING SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT 
OF YOUNG ADULTHOOD 
Although the biological and psychological account of maturation is 
incomplete, it is clear that the transition to social adulthood is grounded in 
cultural norms that vary over time (and across cultures), dictating when 
young people are expected to achieve independence and assume adult roles.  
Demographic research indicates that, today, young adults in the United 
States and other developed societies experience a prolonged and stressful 
period of transition to adulthood.  Contemporary society is marked by 
increased knowledge and information transfer, heightened risks, fairly low 
social mobility, and greater economic inequality—changes that have placed 
greater demands on young adults than previous generations experienced, 
while also providing less latitude for failure.78  Not so long ago, the typical 
transitional path for most young adults was to graduate from high school, 
enter college or the workforce, leave home, establish an enduring romantic 
relationship, marry, and start a family.  These milestones provided structure 
and direction for most young adults as they assumed adult responsibilities; 
they also  fostered connection with the larger society and its institutions.  
Today, those pathways are considerably less predictable, often extended, 
and—for many—significantly more challenging.79 
Based on this trend, a 2014 IOM/NRC report characterized young 
adulthood in our society as a “critical” developmental period80 that has a 
 
 77. See generally LD Selemon, A Role for Synaptic Plasticity in the Adolescent 
Development of Executive Function, 3 TRANSLATIONAL PSYCHIATRY 1 (2013). 
 78. INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 35–67. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Young adults continue to mature socially, psychologically, and biologically; 
however, social features of maturation predominate during this period. See id. at 1–3. 
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profound impact on individuals’ future life-course trajectories, analogous to 
the critical periods of early childhood and adolescence.  Success or failure 
during this time can have a lifelong impact.  Thus, the stakes are high both 
for young adults and for society.  The report drew out the policy 
implications of this social trend, particularly emphasizing the need to 
provide developmentally appropriate supports and interventions for young 
adults during this period.81 
A.  Education and Employment 
Achievement of financial independence has become a prolonged and 
uncertain challenge for an increasing number of young adults.  College 
enrollment has increased dramatically in recent years,82 but many students 
who enroll in college do not earn a degree.83  Indeed, the college graduation 
rate in the United States has dropped even as enrollment rates have 
increased.84  In part, this is because the cost of college has grown 
substantially, and many students are unable to finance the investment.  Yet 
prospects for well-paying jobs for young adults without a college degree are 
slim. 
The problem for young adults without a college degree has been 
exacerbated in recent decades by the sharply reduced number of good 
manufacturing jobs.  Even accounting for the increased percentage of young 
adults attending college (and thus not in the work force), the unemployment 
rate among individuals under age twenty-five is twice that of the general 
population.85  This disparity has been growing in recent decades and has 
become especially pronounced since the start of the 2008 recession.86  
Young adults without a college degree who are employed generally receive 
low wages because they lack skills needed for higher paying, knowledge-
based jobs.87  Many obtain only part-time employment.  Not surprisingly 
perhaps, the earning gap between college graduates and those with only a 
high school education has more than doubled since 1980.88  Today, young 
adults without a college degree—a cohort that includes most individuals in 
 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 129. 
 83. See id. at 135. 
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the justice system—face greater challenges in attaining financial self-
sufficiency as adults than did earlier generations. 
B.  Partnering and Parenting 
A similar gap has emerged in contemporary patterns of family formation.  
Traditionally, marriage was a marker of adult status and independence from 
parents across social classes.89  For middle and upper class couples, 
marriage often followed graduation from college, while working class 
couples tended to marry at an earlier age.90  Today, middle class individuals 
tend to become independent of their parents, marry, and have children years 
later than their parents did.91  In part, of course, this is because the period of 
young adulthood is devoted to education, skills training, and career 
development for this cohort.  Such investment in human capital can be more 
readily accomplished without family responsibilities.  For less educated 
young adults, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, the 
pattern is quite different.  Marriage has become less common altogether for 
this group, and partnering typically takes the form of informal, often 
unstable, unions.92  Many less educated young people have children outside 
of marriage, often before they have the skills and income to support a 
family.93  In turn, the burden of raising children impedes young parents’ 
ability to acquire the skills and training necessary to become economically 
self-sufficient. 
C.  Inequality 
Recent changes in the established economic and social pathways of 
young adulthood have presented more choice and opportunity for some 
young adults and created more barriers for many others.  Of particular 
importance for our purposes is the impact of these economic and social 
trends on marginalized young adults from disadvantaged backgrounds—
namely, those who are children of low-income immigrants, those aging out 
of foster care, those with histories of involvement in the justice system, 
those with disabilities, and those who dropped out of school.  These young 
adults are substantially less likely than their peers to experience a successful 
transition to adulthood.94  Compared with other young adults, for example, 
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former foster youths are less likely to graduate from high school, have 
lower rates of college attendance, suffer from more mental and physical 
health problems, and experience higher levels of housing instability and 
homelessness; they are more likely to be dependent on public assistance and 
unemployed, and be involved with the criminal justice system.95  These 
disadvantaged young adults also are less likely to marry or cohabitate and 
are more likely to have children outside of marriage.96  A particular source 
of concern is the increase in early parenthood by adolescents and young 
adults in this cohort and the increasing number of young children with one 
or more incarcerated parents.97 
Young adults in the justice system largely belong to a cohort of 
individuals whose prospects of making a successful transition to adulthood 
are poor.  As a 2015 IOM/NRC report emphasized, meeting the needs of 
marginalized young adults not only has the potential to improve their lives 
and reduce persistent inequalities due to family background, but it can also 
help them become more fully contributing members of society.98  Absent 
deliberate action by policymakers, however, this period of development is 
likely to magnify inequality, with lasting effects through adulthood.  For 
young adult offenders, the cost of failing to intervene to promote successful 
maturation extends even beyond the enormous social cost of continued 
involvement in criminal activity.  Many young adults in the justice system 
have children born into nonmarital relationships; thus, an increasing 
number of children have one or more incarcerated parent.99  This concern 
led the IOM/NRC committee to highlight the urgency of investing in 
incarcerated and otherwise marginalized young adults and their children to 
interrupt the transmission of disadvantage from generation to generation.100 
Young adulthood is a period of risk and heightened stress for those 
individuals without the support and resources they need.  This includes 
young adult offenders whose prospects for productive lives may depend on 
the justice system’s response to their crimes.  Counterintuitively perhaps, 
their criminal offending presents the opportunity for intervening in ways 
that can serve their interests and society’s interest as well. 
III.  YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The developmental and sociological research described in Parts I and II 
supports justice system reforms that focus on young adults as a transitional 
category of offenders between juveniles and adults.  The research, although 
not conclusive, indicates that offending by young adults often may be 
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driven by tendencies toward impulsivity and risk-taking that characterize 
much of the criminal activity of juveniles.101  This conclusion is also 
supported by empirical data on age patterns in risky behavior.102  If 
immaturity continues to play a role in criminal involvement beyond age 
eighteen, many young adults, like most juveniles, are likely to desist from 
criminal involvement as they mature.  Moreover, recent social and 
economic trends have prolonged the period of dependency and vulnerability 
into adulthood.103  Against this backdrop, the potential criminogenic effects 
of imprisonment and the benefits of rehabilitative programs for young adult 
offenders have become more salient.104  In short, our expanded knowledge 
about this period of life supports legal changes that acknowledge young 
adults’ potential for reform and aim to facilitate offenders’ transitions to 
noncriminal adulthood. 
The approach to reform that we propose draws on the developmental 
model that has powerfully influenced the law’s response to juvenile crime 
in the past decade.105  Like juveniles, young adults are most usefully 
classified as a distinct category of offenders in recognition of the social 
reality that young adulthood, like adolescence, is a critical developmental 
period.106  This does not mean, however, that eighteen- to twenty-one-year-
olds generally should be reclassified as juveniles or that their crimes should 
be adjudicated in the juvenile court. 
The evidence suggests that young adult offenders are developmentally 
distinguishable from adolescents in several ways.  Furthermore, as we 
discuss below, pragmatic considerations militate against categorically 
raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to twenty-one.107  But, just as 
the justice system has come to recognize that adolescents are neither 
innocent children nor fully responsible adults, lawmakers should understand 
that young adults occupy a transitional developmental space between 
adolescents and mature adults.  As we will explain, this approach supports 
reforms in the adult justice system directed toward young adults that not 
only enhance the welfare of these individuals but also offer the potential to 
reduce crime.  These reforms include special sentencing and parole policies, 
as well as correctional programs that aim to provide young adult offenders 
with the skills necessary to function adequately in adult roles. 
Attention to the research evidence comes at a propitious time:  when 
many lawmakers and the public increasingly are receptive to reform.  The 
extraordinary increase in incarceration rates over the past forty years has 
generated sharp criticism across the political spectrum.108  Critics recognize 
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that overincarceration has had only a modest impact on crime reduction,  
while it has generated a wide range of well-documented financial and social 
costs:  the latter have particularly burdened the large cohort of incarcerated 
young adults.109  It is well understood that criminal convictions and 
incarceration negatively affect employment, educational attainment, and 
civic engagement, diminishing the prospect that young adult offenders will 
become productive citizens or assume conventional adult roles.110  The call 
for reform is made even more urgent because the consequences of our penal 
policies fall disproportionately on racial and ethnic minorities.111 
A.  Young Adulthood:  A Transitional Category 
The boundary between childhood and adulthood typically creates binary 
legal categories:  individuals are either adults or children for particular legal 
purposes.  For most purposes, age eighteen marks the boundary, but the line 
between childhood and adulthood is sometimes drawn either before or after 
this age.112  For example, young adults are sometimes classified as legal 
children; they cannot obtain and drink alcoholic beverages and may be 
entitled to financial support from noncustodial parents while they attend 
college.113  These regulations recognize that a categorical assumption that 
eighteen-year-olds conform to the conventional expectations of adults in 
their maturity, competence, and independence sometimes can undermine 
social welfare.114 
In the context of justice policy, age classification is more complex in a 
way that may be instructive for reforming the law’s response to young adult 
offenders.  To be sure, the binary norm currently prevails in the 
classification of adults in the justice system:  eighteen- and thirty-five-year-
old offenders typically have been subject to undifferentiated treatment as 
“adults.”  But in dealing with juvenile offenders, contemporary lawmakers 
have effectively created an intermediate category.  Under the recent legal 
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reforms, the response to juvenile offending has been tailored to the 
developmental needs and capacities of adolescents.115 
The acknowledgement that teenage offenders are neither children nor 
adults is grounded in pragmatic, political, and scientific considerations that 
have emerged from the recognition that the law’s conventional binary 
approach is unsatisfactory as a basis for responding to juvenile crime.116  
The traditional characterization of young offenders as children who lacked 
responsibility for their crimes seemed discordant as applied to older youths 
who committed violent crimes. Not surprisingly, perhaps, this approach  
was effectively ridiculed by the punitive law reformers of the 1990s.117  But 
their view that juveniles are not different from adult criminals has also been 
rejected as costly, offensive to conventional morality, and inconsistent with 
developmental research.118  Under modern law reforms, juveniles are held 
accountable for their crimes, but their culpability is mitigated as compared 
to adults.119  Furthermore, contemporary lawmakers increasingly realize 
that correctional programs and dispositions tailored to the developmental 
needs of adolescent offenders are more likely to reduce crime at a lower 
cost than either punitive adult sanctions or permissive policies that treat 
delinquent youth as children. A core objective of modern justice policy (and 
one submerged until recently) is to facilitate the transition of teenage 
offenders to productive adulthood by providing a healthy developmental 
context and giving them the tools they need to succeed. 
This model can be adapted to young adult offenders, who also can be 
usefully classified as a transitional category, but one located within the 
adult justice system.  Like juveniles, young adults are not fully mature and 
are more likely to reform than are older offenders.  Also like juveniles, 
young adult offenders are in a critical period in which programs targeted to 
their developmental needs may powerfully influence their future lives in a 
positive direction.  The monolithic classification of offenders over age 
eighteen under contemporary law assumes that uniform offense-based 
sentencing policies directed at adults regardless of age will protect the 
public and reduce crime.  But this strategy is shortsighted to the extent that 
much young adult crime is the product of immature risk-taking propensities 
and that investment during this developmental period could facilitate these 
offenders’ transitions to productive adult lives.  At the same time, however, 
existing research does not support the classification of young adults as 
juveniles.120  As we explain below, under current conditions, an 
institutional structure that generally treats young adults as separate 
transitional category of criminal offenders is likely to enhance the 
effectiveness of justice policy. 
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B.  Twenty-First Century Criminal Justice:  
A Developmental Approach to Young Adult Offenders 
In this section, we suggest how an understanding of young adulthood as a 
period of biological, psychological, and social maturation might be 
translated into policies and programs directed at this group of offenders.  
The elements of reform already exist:  some proposals draw on sentencing 
and parole policies directed at juvenile offenders, while others (youthful 
offender statutes) would revive ameliorative statutory policies enacted in an 
earlier era.121  The heart of reform, however, is an ongoing project to 
develop effective interventions to provide young adult offenders with the 
tools to make the transition to productive adulthood.  Just as policymakers 
in the juvenile system turned to evidence-based correctional programs 
grounded in developmental knowledge in seeking effective responses to 
juvenile crime, criminal justice officials in some jurisdictions have begun to 
invest in programs directed at young adults in pursuit of the same goal.122  
As we explain, although few programs have been evaluated, investment in 
promising correctional programs that promote healthy development in these 
still maturing offenders is likely to be the most effective response to their 
criminal conduct. 
1.  Young Adult Offender Status for Nonviolent Offenders 
For young adults who commit nonviolent crimes, a regime modeled on 
the young offender statutes enacted in the 1960s and 1970s123 can preserve 
future life options.  These statutes create a special status, extending 
rehabilitative features of juvenile proceedings to eligible young adults (as 
well as transferred juveniles) who are prosecuted in the criminal courts.124  
Young offender status limits sentence duration and shields offenders from 
the burdensome collateral consequences of having a criminal record, which 
can severely restrict their ability to pursue educational, employment, and 
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WAYNE L. REV. 1391, 1396 (1981); Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release 
Equals Rehabilitation:  How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 
16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 24–26 (2011).  One of the most comprehensive statutes is New 
York’s, which provides for confidentiality of records, restrictions on the consequences of a 
criminal conviction, and lenient sentencing alternatives. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW §§ 720.15, 720.35; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.02 (McKinney 2009). See generally Alison 
Marie Grinnell, Note, Searching for a Solution:  The Future of New York’s Juvenile Offender 
Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. HUM. RTS. 635 (2000). 
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even housing opportunities essential to the transition to adulthood.125  
Typically, trial courts have discretion to confer this status on a young adult 
offender charged with designated crimes, and some laws restrict the status 
to first-time offenders.126  Most statutes limit the maximum sentence to 
between one and three years.127  Other consequences of being designated as 
a young offender vary from state to state and include the opportunity to 
avoid a criminal conviction (and thus a criminal record)128 and to have the 
record sealed after a period of good behavior.129  A contemporary young 
offender statute could confer the status presumptively on all adults under 
twenty-one and transferred juveniles charged with particular crimes, 
including misdemeanors, most property crimes, and drug possession 
offenses.130  Beyond this, brief sentences, together with protection from the 
collateral consequences of criminal conviction, can help preserve the 
opportunities for productive adult lives for many young adult offenders. 
2.  Sentencing and Parole Policies 
For young adults who commit serious violent offenses, young offender 
status is unlikely to be deemed sufficiently protective of public safety.  
Nonetheless, their relative youth should be considered in sentencing.  Age 
has long been considered a basis for mitigation under both capital and 
noncapital sentencing statutes.131  Immaturity has featured most 
prominently as a key mitigating factor in juvenile sentencing cases,132 but 
recently courts sentencing young adults also have begun to consider 
 
 125. See generally COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND 
IMPROVING OTHER OUTCOMES FOR YOUNG ADULTS IN THE JUVENILE AND ADULT CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS (Nov. 2015) (discussing the collateral consequences of having a criminal 
record and the ways in which it inhibits the ability of young adults to transition to productive 
adulthood). 
 126. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 762.11 (excluding offenses carrying a maximum 
penalty of life imprisonment, major controlled substance offenses, traffic offenses, and 
criminal sexual conduct, and excluding offenders with a prior conviction or adjudication for 
an offense requiring a sex-offender registration); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.10(3) 
(excluding murder, armed felonies, rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first 
degree, or aggravated sexual abuse). 
 127. See ALA. CODE § 15-19-6(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2011) (limiting to no more than three 
years for felonies); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 958.04(1)(2)(c)-(d) (limiting to no more than six 
years); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 762.13(1) (limiting to no more than one year); N.Y. 
PENAL CODE §§ 60.02(2), 70.00(2)(e) (limiting to no more than four years for most felonies). 
 128. See ALA. CODE § 15-19-7(a); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 762.11(1); N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 720.35(1). 
 129. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-920(B) (2007) (providing for applications to expunge 
records of arrest and conviction fifteen years after conviction). 
 130. The New York legislature is currently considering a bill that proposes a presumption 
of youthful offender status to young defendants who do not have a prior conviction or 
adjudication for a felony. See Assemb. 238-7642, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. § 79 (N.Y. 2015); 
S. 238-5642, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. § 79 (N.Y. 2015). 
 131. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(G)(5) (2010) (considering the defendant’s age 
as a mitigating circumstance); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(3)(C)(b)(7) (same); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-3-207(4)(e) (LexisNexis 2012) (same). 
 132. See supra notes 2, 36 and accompanying text. 
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evidence of immaturity in mitigation.133  In 2015, for example, an Illinois 
court set aside a mandatory sentence of life without parole imposed on a 
nineteen-year-old as a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment.134  The court cited the Supreme Court’s 
juvenile sentencing opinions and also pointed to developmental research 
indicating that brain maturation continues into the twenties.135  This 
evidence can also support a presumption that mandatory minimum adult 
sentencing regimes should exclude young adult offenders, just as juvenile 
offenders are excluded in some states.136 
The determination of whether a reduced sentence is warranted can also 
be made ex post through parole policies designed for young adult offenders.  
Some states have adopted special statutes that allow juvenile prisoners 
sentenced for serious offenses in the adult system to petition for expedited 
parole and provide programmatic assistance to prepare them for the 
hearing.137  These laws are premised on developmental evidence that much 
juvenile crime is the product of immaturity and that many young offenders 
will reform as they mature.138  If the crimes of many young adult offenders 
similarly represent impulsive risk-taking behavior that is characteristic of 
this period of life, their inclination to offend is likely to decline with 
maturation.  A special parole statute would allow the young adult offender 
to demonstrate, on an expedited basis, that he no longer represents a threat 
to society.  These prisoners can be held accountable and public safety can 
be protected through briefer sentences than those imposed on prisoners who 
offended as older adults or who have not demonstrated reform. 
3.  Specialized Correctional Facilities and Programs 
At this point, the justice system has only begun to offer correctional 
programs or special facilities aimed at young adult offenders (and juvenile 
offenders sentenced as adults),139 and few programs have been subject to 
rigorous evaluation.  Thus, no blueprint exists for transforming correctional 
 
 133. See, e.g., United States v. C.R., 296 F.R.D. 131, 132–35 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); People v. 
House, No. 1-11-0580, 2015 WL 9428803, at *27 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 24, 2015). 
 134. See House, 2015 WL 9428803, at *27; see also C.R., 296 F.R.D. at 132–35 
(sentencing a nineteen-year-old defendant to the five year minimum).  In a lengthy 
memorandum, Judge Jack Weinstein described the research on brain development in young 
adulthood as justification for imposing the minimum sentence. See Sentencing 
Memorandum, C.R., 296 F.R.D. 131 (No. 09 Cr. 0155 (JBW)), 2013 WL 11263190. 
 135. See Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 134. 
 136. See State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 386 (Iowa 2014) (finding mandatory minimum 
sentences inappropriate for juveniles). 
 137. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801 (West 2011) (special expedited parole statute for 
juvenile offenders); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 2014). 
 138. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801, pmbl. (offering this rationale). 
 139. Colorado’s Youthful Offender System (YOS) was legislatively created primarily to 
reduce recidivism in violent offenders, both transferred juveniles and (through a later statute) 
young adults ages eighteen and nineteen, and to provide them with the means to become 
productive adult citizens. See COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, EVALUATION OF THE YOUTHFUL 
OFFENDER SYSTEM (YOS) IN COLORADO:  A REPORT OF FINDINGS PER 18-1.3-408, C.R.S. 14–
17 (2014). 
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policy. However, promising reforms implemented in the juvenile system 
over the past generation provide guidance for policymakers focusing on 
young adult offenders.  Effective juvenile programs, policies, and practices 
that are tailored to the unique needs of this population can be—and are 
being—adapted for young adults.140  For example, multi-systemic therapy, 
which has been shown to effectively reduce recidivism in juveniles, is being 
adapted to treat young adults.141  Substance abuse and other mental health 
services, as well as social skills training, are important interventions with 
young adult offenders, as with juveniles.  Finally, developing effective 
educational and vocational skills training programs for this age cohort is 
essential to successful justice policy and poses a challenge perhaps even 
greater than in the juvenile justice context.  Sociological research indicates 
that young adult offenders are often detached from the socializing 
institutions of work and family that reduce recidivism.142  What is needed is 
a comprehensive effort to provide these offenders with programs and 
facilities that will aid in promoting their integration into the larger society 
as productive adults. 
Increasingly, states and localities have begun to take up this challenge, 
persuaded that policies targeting young adult offenders potentially can be an 
effective means to reduce recidivism.  Localities have developed promising 
community-based programs for young adult offenders that provide 
intensive services and supervision, with good employment and recidivism-
reduction outcomes.143  For incarcerated young adult offenders, some states 
have created separate facilities modeled on successful juvenile facilities and 
programs.  These facilities have developmentally trained staff and 
emphasize education, workforce development, and cognitive behavioral 
training and typically are connected with specialized aftercare services.144  
Programs directed at young adults within integrated facilities are also being 
 
 140. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., supra note 125, at 7. 
 141. See id.  Multisystemic therapy has been one of the most effective programs with 
both violent and nonviolent juvenile offenders. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 
217–20. 
 142. See Schiraldi et al., supra note 6, at 4. 
 143. The San Francisco Adult Probation Transitional Age Youth Unit is a successful 
community-based program. See id. at 11.  Roca, a Massachusetts program that combines 
cognitive behavioral therapy, substance abuse treatment, and best-practice community 
corrections, has effectively reduced recidivism and increased employment in justice-
involved high-risk young men. See id. at 12. 
 144. The Colorado YOS is among the most comprehensive programs aimed at young 
adults ages eighteen and nineteen. See generally COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 
139.  First established in 1994 for violent juvenile offenders in the adult system, YOS houses 
offenders in separate facilities and provides specially designed programs and services that 
focus on academics, rehabilitation, and the development of prosocial behaviors and reentry 
planning.  The recidivism rates of offenders who successfully complete the YOS program 
(most offenders) is far better than comparable offenders.  YOS offenders receive career and 
technical education, anger management treatment, and substance abuse treatment. See id. at 
43.  New York City and California are developing facilities for young adults.  The planned 
California facility (the California Leadership Academy) is modeled on the successful 
“Missouri Model” of juvenile residential facilities. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE 
CTR., supra note 125, at 14. 
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developed.145  Through these programs, policymakers recognize that even 
when incarceration is justified for punishment and public protection, 
society’s interests, as well as that of offenders, are served by investing in 
the education, health, and well-being of young adults who will eventually 
be allowed to return to the community.146 
C.  Why Not Extend the Jurisdictional Age of Juvenile Court? 
As we have indicated, reforms in the justice system’s treatment of young 
adult offenders should build on the developmental approach to juvenile 
justice.  Thus, the natural next move might seem to be a unitary 
rehabilitative justice system with general jurisdiction over juveniles and 
young adults.  Nonetheless, we are hesitant to argue for this bold reform for 
several reasons. 
As we have shown, the scientific evidence does not currently justify an 
institutional reform of this magnitude.  Moreover, the political and practical 
obstacles to such a change are formidable.  Although modest steps toward 
consolidating responses to minor offenses by young adults may be feasible, 
it is not clear that, under current conditions, the interests of either juveniles 
or young adults would be promoted by a unitary justice system. 
Some reformers have pointed to neuroscience and other research in 
advocating that young adults be adjudicated in the juvenile system.147  But 
the research supporting the presumption underlying the lenient, 
rehabilitative approach of the juvenile system—that youthful offending is 
driven by developmental immaturity—is weaker for young adults.148  
Because of their youth, adolescents are deemed less culpable and more 
malleable than older offenders.  The emerging developmental evidence 
indicates that young adult brains are developing and that these offenders 
may be similar to adolescents in their impulsivity.149  However, the 
developmental factors that likely drive offending in younger teens are 
subtler in young adults, and, in some regards, young adults are more like 
older adults than teenagers.150  As explained in Part I, scientific evidence is 
simply not robust enough to support a response of categorical leniency 
toward young adult offenders. 
We are also concerned that raising the age for juvenile court adjudication 
to twenty-one may have the unintended consequence of making adolescents 
 
 145. See About the Division of Juvenile Justice, CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & 
REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Juvenile_Justice/About_DJJ/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2016) (providing training and treatment to young adult offenders) 
[https://perma.cc/59FM-CQEG]; FLA. S., INTERIM REPORT ON YOUTHFUL OFFENDER 
DESIGNATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, S. 2011-114, at 3 (2010) (providing 
educational, work, and rehabilitative programs to young adult offenders). 
 146. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 361–66. 
 147. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra Part I. 
 149. See supra Part I. 
 150. Young adults respond more like adolescents on measures of self-control under 
conditions of threat, but they perform more like adults under conditions of positive arousal. 
See supra Part I. 
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in the justice system worse off than under the current regime without 
producing the intended benefits for young adults.  Political reality dictates 
that public safety will always be a preeminent concern of justice policy.  
Indeed, the juvenile system, with its commitment to rehabilitation, often has 
been challenged on the ground that its lenient response to young offenders 
sacrifices public safety.151  During periods when public fears about violent 
juvenile crime are aroused, such as the 1990s, politicians have responded by 
adopting punitive laws facilitating the adult prosecution and punishment of 
juveniles.152  To be sure, the moral panic of that period has receded.  But 
the lessons of the 1990s are that public and political acceptance of the 
special status of juveniles is tentative and that the developmental approach 
to juvenile justice policy could be readily destabilized.153  Extending the 
general jurisdiction of the juvenile system to age twenty-one would only 
increase its vulnerability.  A system committed to leniency and to more 
abbreviated sanctions is unlikely to be deemed satisfactory in dealing with a 
category of offenders who commit a substantial percentage of serious 
offenses.154  Moreover, young adult offenders have different needs than 
younger juveniles, and integrating substantial numbers of young adults into 
the juvenile system could have a negative impact on its ability to serve the 
needs of the youths who are its primary concern.155 
Young adults themselves are likely to attain greater benefit from 
institutional reforms in the adult system than from juvenile status.  Even if 
the age of juvenile court jurisdiction were raised, young adults charged with 
serious crimes predictably would be transferred to an adult system with few 
programs or policies dedicated to their rehabilitation.  Reformers are better 
advised to concentrate on ameliorative institutional reforms in the adult 
system.  As the youngest offenders within the jurisdiction of the adult 
system, young adults have a claim to correctional responses that 
acknowledge their transitional status and potential for reform.  More 
importantly, perhaps, if programs tailored to the needs of young adult 
offenders reduce crime by giving them the tools to assume conventional 
adult roles, society may also reap substantial benefits. 
Modest extensions of juvenile court jurisdiction are possible.  Indeed, 
many states have extended the jurisdictional age for juvenile court 
 
 151. See generally SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1. 
 152. See id. at 94–99 (discussing moral panics of the 1990s in response to an increase in 
juvenile crime); Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile 
Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535 (2013). 
 153. See generally Scott, supra note 152. 
 154. See generally Perkins, supra note 12. 
 155. See Tamar R. Birckhead, North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, and the 
Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1143, 1494–500 (2008) (discussing arguments against 
raising the age of the juvenile system, such as expansion of an already underfunded system); 
see also Nancy L. Iredale & Paul L. Joffe, Between Juvenile and Adult Courts:  A No Man’s 
Land for the Youthful Offender, YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION, Spring 1971, at 49, 52–53 
(noting arguments made by a juvenile court judge that the juvenile system’s facilities for 
treating older offenders are inadequate and that raising the age of the juvenile system would 
dilute the trust and efficacy of the special handling of juveniles by a specialist court). 
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dispositions to twenty-one or even beyond.156  This extension allows older 
juveniles, whose offenses and age warrant more extensive interventions 
than would be possible if jurisdiction ended at age eighteen, to avoid 
transfer and the harsh sanctions of the adult system and to benefit as young 
adults from programs in the juvenile system.  A more innovative reform 
(and an alternative to young offender status)157 would be the extension of 
juvenile court jurisdiction to individuals who commit minor crimes as 
young adults.  Adjudication and disposition in the juvenile system of these 
offenders allows them to avoid the stigma of criminal conviction, without 
an undue destabilizing impact on the juvenile system.158 
CONCLUSION 
At a time when policymakers and the public are likely to be receptive to 
reforms that reduce crime, developmental and sociological research 
supports a new approach to young adult offenders.  Drawing on lessons 
from juvenile justice reforms, we argue that individuals in this age cohort 
should be treated as a discrete and transitional category between juveniles 
and adults.  Tailoring sentencing policies to this group and investing in 
effective programs to give them the tools to become productive noncriminal 
adults will serve social welfare, as well as the interests of the most 
vulnerable young adults. 
 
 156. Statutes in thirty-five states extend dispositional jurisdiction beyond age eighteen. 
See State Statutes Define Who Is Under Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, JUV. OFFENDER & 
VICTIMS NAT’L REP. SERIES BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, 
Wash. D.C.), June 2003, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/195420.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
A5EW-MYCJ]. 
 157. See supra notes 126–34 and accompanying text. 
 158. An alternative is youthful offender status that shields criminal records. See supra 
notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
